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Abstract 
The highly interactive nature of interpersonal 
communication on online social networks (OSNs) 
impels us to think about privacy as a communal 
matter, with users’ private information being 
revealed by not only their own voluntary disclosures, 
but also the activities of their social ties.  The current 
privacy literature has identified two types of 
information disclosures in OSNs: self-disclosure, i.e., 
the disclosure of an OSN user’s private information 
by him/herself; and co-disclosure, i.e., the disclosure 
of the user’s private information by other users. 
Although co-disclosure has been increasingly 
identified as a new source of privacy threat inherent 
to the OSN context, few systematic attempts have 
been made to provide a framework for understanding 
the commonalities and distinctions between self- vs. 
co-disclosure, especially pertaining to different types 
of private information. To address this gap, this 
paper presents a data-driven study that builds upon 
an innovative measurement for quantifying the extent 
to which others’ co-disclosure could lead to actual 
privacy harm. The results demonstrate the significant 
harm caused by co-disclosure and illustrate the 
differences between the identity elements revealed 
through self- and co-disclosure.  
1. Introduction  
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have 
increasingly facilitated users’ voluntary information 
disclosures that may not only reveal their own 
identities but also their social ties’ identities (e.g., 
tagging a friend in a status update or in a place 
checked-in). Such highly interactive nature of 
interpersonal communication and data exchange 
impels us to think about privacy as a communal 
matter. As a result, there is a growing recognition of 
grounding the investigation of privacy as an 
interdependent phenomenon (Biczók and Chia 2013; 
Jia and Xu 2015; 2016): While individuals are free to 
decide what personal information they disclose, they 
often cannot control what others disclose about them, 
or how others may use the private information that 
they disclose. Likewise, people may share 
information that involves others in ways that violate 
others’ privacy preferences. In recent privacy 
literature, such interdependent nature of information 
disclosure has been implicitly assumed as a new 
source of privacy threat inherent to the OSN context.  
However, there is almost no research that has 
empirically quantified the extent to which others’ 
disclosure of information about an individual could 
lead to actual privacy harm. As a first step to address 
this gap in existing literature, we develop an 
innovative measurement to capture an individual’s 
actual privacy loss caused by self-disclosure vs. by 
co-disclosure (i.e., disclosure of one’s private 
information by other users of the OSN). To achieve 
this research objective, we considered Twitter as a 
case study. Specifically, we selected a sample of 
Twitter users located in the US, retrieved all their 
tweets along with the tweets of their followers, 
identified the identity elements of a user that can be 
inferred from his/her own tweets (self-disclosure) or 
the tweets of his/her followers (co-disclosure), and 
then proposed an information-theoretic measure that 
captures the additional amount of privacy loss caused 
by co-disclosure (on top of information that is 
already self-disclosed). 
The current study contributes to existing privacy 
research in several important ways. First, prior 
privacy research has heavily relied on collecting self-
reported data to measure privacy related intentions or 
beliefs as a proxy to study outcome variables. Given 
that users often behave not necessarily in rational 
ways when it concerns their privacy behaviors, 
Bélanger & Xu (2015) suggested IS researchers to 
“focus on actual behaviors as opposed to merely 
individual intentions to behave when studying 
information privacy.” The current research addressed 
this methodological challenge by quantifying 
possible negative consequences that could result from 
users’ real information disclosure behaviors. Second, 
positivist approaches have dominated in the IS field 
where theory-based work has defined, predicted and 
explained privacy-related constructs in various 
nomological models (Smith et al. 2011). Although 
the theory-based work has helped us build stronger 
theoretical foundation and methodological rigor, 
“some of us are increasingly raising doubts about 
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whether we can relate what we have found in our 
research to what practitioners or policymakers truly 
experience in reality” (Bélanger & Xu 2015). This 
research aims to extend the literature by pursuing a 
data-driven approach to measure real information 
privacy harms with observational Twitter data.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The 
next section presents a review of background and 
related literature. Following that, we define the 
research questions studied in this paper, and describe 
the two key components for measuring privacy loss: 
the identity linkage model used by an adversary and 
the information-theoretic metric of privacy 
disclosure.  Equipped with the privacy-loss 
measurement, we present our research methodology, 
including the data collection process and the 
experimental design over Twitter.  We then describe 
our research results and explain how these results 
address the research questions.  We conclude the 
paper with discussions of limitations and potential 
extensions of our work.   
2. Literature Review  
2.1. Interpersonal Privacy Concerns on OSNs 
Data privacy online and offline are of prime 
importance to individuals. By revealing their personal 
information, individuals make observers of their 
personal information co-owners of it. This introduces 
the problem known as interdependent privacy: users 
are no longer in control of their privacy as other 
users’ actions and interactions can affect their privacy 
(Biczók and Chia 2013). Several research papers 
have enriched our understanding of interdependent 
privacy (Biczók and Chia 2013; Choi et al 2015; Pu 
and Grossklags 2015). However, very few papers 
focused on interdependent privacy in the OSNs 
domain. Shi et al. (2013) identified users’ 
interpersonal privacy concerns arising from changes 
in the visibility of their social interactions in 
Facebook and the accessibility to it, aggregated, in a 
single time-lined page. Even though no new 
information has been revealed, but aggregating 
interpersonal information can reveal more details 
about individuals in unexpected ways (Shi et al. 
2013). Choi et al (2015) offered insights on the 
effects of interdependent privacy by evaluating 
embarrassing exposures and found that even though 
users might feel embarrassed, they still value the 
social rewards of such disclosures. Although this 
stream of research has conceptually identified users’ 
concerns towards interdependent privacy, there is a 
lack of research examining the extent to which 
others’ disclosure of information about an individual 
could lead to actual privacy harm. We aim to address 
this gap in this research by developing a framework 
for understanding the commonalities and distinctions 
between self- vs. co-disclosure, especially pertaining 
to different types of private information. 
2.2. Re-Identification Risks 
An individual’s identity could be derived from 
data generated from both online and offline worlds 
(Creese et al. 2013; Ananthula et al 2015; Li and 
Wang 2015). In particular, one’s offline identity 
includes data elements such as name, date of birth, 
gender, nationality, and relationships; online identity 
includes data elements such as username, browsing 
history, and email. Attribute disclosure occurs when 
disclosed information help reveal a sensitive attribute 
about an individual and associate it with the 
individual (Li and Li 2009). No matter how mundane 
the information, its disclosure can have significant 
repercussions (Stutzman et al. 2013). That is because 
seemingly innocuous information such as 
demographic information (Sweeney 2000), movie 
ratings (Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008) and search 
queries (Barbaro and Zeller 2006) could be used to 
identify individuals and reveal sensitive details about 
them. 
In today’s digital world, the rising threat to 
privacy is further increased by the information found 
in various data sources. More and more personal data 
are collected and shared, including sensitive data 
such as health and financial records that can be 
publicly accessible online and remain available 
indefinitely. Thus the increasing availability of 
auxiliary records related to individuals has allowed 
records to be linked and personal identities to be 
revealed (Sweeney 2001). In addition, today’s OSNs 
could afford new capabilities to combine social 
identity elements with personal identity elements, 
which will improve the accuracy of the identity 
linkage techniques (Li and Wang 2011; Li and Wang 
2015; Park et al. 2012). This increases the threats to 
individuals’ privacy and makes OSNs a gateway to 
access individuals’ personal information (Acquisti 
2004; Madden et al. 2007). 
3. Research Questions 
As discussed in the literature review section, 
researchers have recently recognized the existence of 
both self- and co-disclosure of private information in 
social interactions, including those occurring on 
OSNs (Jia and Xu 2015). Although there have been 
several co-disclosure-centric studies focusing on how 
various settings of OSNs can affect the arising of a 
user’s privacy concerns from other users’ activities 
(Shi et al. 2013, Choi et al. 2015, Jia and Xu 2015), 
these studies do not further drill into the distinctions 
between different types of private information (e.g., 
demographics, location, occupation). As a result, we 
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do not yet sufficiently understand what types of 
private information are more likely to be co-disclosed 
by other users than self-disclosed by oneself; what 
types of social interactions are more likely to lead to 
co-disclosures of private information; and whether 
such co-disclosure can indeed reveal a user’s identity 
that would otherwise be hidden from the public. 
Therefore, we aim to study the following two 
research questions in this paper: 
RQ1. What types of personal information are 
more likely to be disclosed through self-disclosure 
than co-disclosure, and vice versa? 
RQ2. Does co-disclosure significantly increase 
the privacy risk for an individual?  Specifically, does 
co-disclosure significantly increase the probability 
for an individual to be uniquely identified based on 
his/her activities on an OSN? 
To address these two questions, we need to first 
build two conceptual foundations.  One, we need a 
proper understanding of the state-of-the-practice 
identity linkage model.  Here we use the term 
“identity linkage model” to refer to the method with 
which a third party, i.e., someone who is neither the 
OSN user of interest nor his/her friend who incurs the 
co-disclosure, can infer the identity of the OSN user 
from a combination of self- and co-disclosed 
information about the user on the OSN.  From this 
point onwards, we refer to such a third party as an 
adversary to the OSN user. Note that the identity 
linkage model includes not only the techniques used 
by the adversary to harvest data from the OSN, but 
also the potential external knowledge sources it might 
use to augment the self- and co-disclosed information 
- in order to unveil the identity of the OSN user. 
Second, we need a quantitative measure for the 
degree of privacy leakage caused by co-disclosure on 
top of self-disclosed information.  To understand why 
this is essential, consider two scenarios as follows: 
Case A where an OSN user self-discloses her real 
name and the city she lives in, while her friend co-
discloses her home location; and Case B where the 
OSN user self-discloses only her first name, while 
her friend co-discloses her home location.  While the 
co-disclosure activity stays the same in the two 
scenarios, the implication of this activity, i.e., the 
additional information it discloses beyond the user’s 
self-disclosures, varies significantly. As such, we 
need a proper metric for the effect of co-disclosure 
activities conditioned upon the self-disclosed 
information. 
In the following section, we describe the identity 
linkage model we shall use in the paper and an 
information-theoretic measure of conditional 
information disclosure.  
4. Measurement Development 
4.1. Identity Linkage Model 
Recall from previous discussions the identity linkage 
model defines the threat faced by an OSN user on the 
privacy front – i.e., how an adversary can violate an 
OSN user’s privacy based on self- and co-disclosed 
information, along with external knowledge sources.   
Given the complexity of privacy construct, both 
conceptually and operationally, and how it varies 
from one individual to another (e.g., one user might 
only care about the disclosure of sexual orientation, 
while another might care more about the disclosure 
of his/her relationship with another user of the OSN), 
to properly define the identity linkage model, we 
must first define the scope of privacy concerns we 
focus on.  For the purpose of this paper, we focus on 
a specific type of privacy concern: the ability for an 
adversary to associate a user of an OSN with the 
user’s real-world identity.  Given this focus, our goal 
is to define an identity linkage model with which an 
adversary unveils the identity of an OSN user from 
the user’s publicly accessible activities on the OSN. 
The identity linkage model has two key elements: 
The first is the world in which the adversary operates 
(Jin et al 2010) - i.e., the population from which the 
adversary attempts to identify the OSN user. For the 
purpose of this paper, we consider the world to be the 
entire population of US. 
The second is the OSN activities used by the 
adversary. A well understood phenomenon of OSNs 
is that many OSN users self-disclose their real-world 
identities or identity elements (i.e., personal attributes 
such as age or gender) through their public profiles at 
the OSN (Malhotra et al. 2012). The underlying 
reason is straightforward - revealing identities in the 
user profile is a simple way to acquire OSN 
connections through real-world acquaintances, as the 
OSN user’s real-world circles of family and friends 
can identify him/her from the profile and build OSN 
connections accordingly. 
Additionally, identities or identity elements may 
also be disclosed through (publicly accessible) social 
interactions between an OSN user and his/her OSN 
connections. Here the disclosure may happen in the 
form of self- or co-disclosure. As an example of the 
latter type, consider a privacy-conscious user who 
chooses to never post a geo-embedded post.  Even so, 
one of her OSN friends might tag her in a geo-
embedded post, essentially revealing her location 
through co-disclosure. 
There are two important observations associated 
with both self- and co-disclosures: One, privacy 
disclosure could happen from contents or metadata of 
OSN activities. An example of the former is when the 
location is described as text in a post, while an 
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example of the latter is when location is revealed 
through a geotag associated with the post.  Second, 
privacy disclosure could happen through explicit 
exposure or implicit inferences. Disclosing the city  
name in a post called “Hometown” is an example of 
explicit exposure, while implicit inference occurs 
when a user has numerous posts geotagged in the 
same city.  In the latter case, even though the user has 
never directly disclosed the city he/she lives in, an 
adversary can easily identify such information 
through common-sense inference.  
4.2. Information-Theoretic Measurement of 
Privacy Disclosure 
To quantify the loss of privacy in an objective 
manner, we introduce an information-theoretic metric 
that can capture not only the overall risk for an OSN 
user to be identified, but also the effect of individual 
identity elements and combinations of them on the 
identification of the OSN user. The root of the 
information-theoretic measurement is the concept of 
information entropy (measured in bits), which 
reflects the degree of uncertainty for a random 
variable with a probability distribution (Cover and 
Thomas 2006). In general, a bit of entropy represents 
the uncertainty associated with a single toss of a fair 
coin. The higher the uncertainty is, the higher the 
entropy will be, and vice versa. This semantic 
definition of information entropy (Brickel and 
Shmatikov 2008) has been used in the literature to 
measure many security and privacy related 
constructs, including genome and genetics privacy 
(Humbert et al. 2013; Erlich and Narayanan 2014). 
In the context of our privacy study, consider the 
uncertainty an adversary faces on identifying an OSN 
user when it has no information about the user 
whatsoever. Roughly speaking, the adversary has no 
way of distinguishing between the 316 million people 
in the US population (per US Census 2013). This 
uncertainty – as reflected by the uniform distribution 
over 316 million possible values - translates to 
log2(316 million) = 28.2 bits of entropy.  Now 
consider the case where the OSN user’s activities 
reveal the user’s gender. Equipped with this identity 
element, the adversary now has a reduced 
uncertainty: from one in 316 million to 
approximately half of it (i.e., about 158 million with 
the same gender).  Correspondingly, the entropy is 
reduced by 1 bit to log2(158 million) = 27.2 bits.  In 
this case, we say that the privacy loss caused by 
gender is 1 bit, i.e., the amount of entropy by which 
the adversary’s uncertainty is reduced.  
More formally, we define the privacy loss caused 
by a set of identity elements E having value V to be 
 
where x1, …, xn form the population under 
consideration (the US population in our case), p(xi) is 
the probability for xi to be the OSN user of interest, 
and p(xi|E = V) is the probability for xi to be the OSN 
user of interest given knowledge that the identity 
elements E of the user have value V.  In our previous 
example, there are p(xi) = 1/316 million for all i ∈ [1, 
316000000], p(xi|Gender = Female) = 1/158 million 
for all i ∈ [1, 158000000]1, and p(xi|Gender = 
Female) = 0 for all i ∈ [158000001, 316000000], 
leading to L(Gender = Female) = –log2158000000 + 
log2316000000 = 1 bit.  Based on this definition, we 
can further define the privacy loss associated with a 
set of identity elements E to be the expected value of 
L(E = V) for all possible values V of E. In the above 
example, we have L(Gender) = 1/2 L(Gender = 
Female) + 1/2 L(Gender = Male) = 1 bit. 
It is important to note that the privacy loss 
function L(•) is not homomorphic to the set union 
operation, but is convex instead (Cover and Thomas 
2006). That is, L(E1) + L(E2) ≥ L(E1∪E2). For 
example, if L(First name) = 10.7 bits while 
L(Gender) = 1 bit, it does not mean L({First name, 
Gender}) = 10.7 + 1 = 11.7 bit.  Instead, the total 
privacy loss from (an adversary learning) both First 
                                                 
1 Without loss of generality, here we assume x1, …, 
x158000000 to be female and the rest of xi to be male. 
Table 1. Identity Elements and their Information Content 
Identity 
Elements 
Gender First 
name 
Last 
name 
Age Month & 
day of birth 
State Zip 
code 
Home 
address 
Privacy Loss 
(bits) 
1† 10.7† 13† 6.3‡ 8.5‡ 5* 13.8* 26.9* 
10.9† 
22.9† 14.7‡ 
*Based on 2010 Census data. 
†Based on 43 million 2015-2016 Voters Registration records from 9 States in the USA. 
‡ Based on 24 million 2015-2016 Voters Registration records from 5 States in the USA (a subset of the previous 
dataset, only these 5 states report date of birth information). 
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name and Gender is smaller, because some part of the 
information revealed by Gender is already revealed 
by First name – e.g., if an adversary knows that the 
OSN user has first name Alice, then it can already 
infer the user’s Gender with high confidence, making 
the privacy loss from further disclosing Gender much 
less than 1 bit. 
As we shall show in latter part of the paper, this 
convexity of privacy loss measure plays a rather 
important role in our understanding of the 
relationship between self- and co-disclosures. Table 1 
summarizes the privacy loss from various identity 
elements and certain combinations of them.  Note 
that, to generate the table, we used multiple datasets 
from the US Census to state voters’ registration 
records, as different datasets feature different identity 
elements included in the table. One can make some 
interesting observations from the table: For example, 
gender and first name turn out to be strongly 
correlated elements, as gender only increases the 
privacy loss by 0.2 bits once first name is revealed. 
On the other hand, the correlation between first name 
or gender and last name is significantly less – the 
privacy loss caused by revealing last name (on top of 
first name and gender) is about 12 bits, only 1 bit less 
than the privacy loss caused by last name alone 
(13bits). 
5. Research Methodology 
Equipped with the identity linkage model and the 
information-theoretic measurement of privacy 
disclosure, we studied the effect of self- and co-
disclosures on the privacy loss of Twitter users. We 
chose Twitter as the OSN platform for our study due 
to two main reasons: 1. Twitter users often post 
tweets that represent direct interactions between each 
other; yet such interactions can be openly accessed 
by third parties – constituting co-disclosure of private 
information. 2. Twitter provides free APIs that 
facilitate the extraction and analysis of large amounts 
of user interaction data.  In the following discussions, 
we describe the data collection process we followed 
and the design of the experiments, respectively. 
5.1. Data Collection 
There are two key elements of the data collection 
process: (1) the set of users we selected for data 
collection; and (2) the data we collected for each 
selected user.  We discuss these two elements 
respectively as follows. 
Selected Users: Since Twitter uses numeric user IDs 
with an easily identifiable range, we started by 
sampling uniformly at random 50,000 numeric IDs, 
and then used the Twitter REST API users/show to 
validate the existence of the user ID and to retrieve 
profile information of the user.  This validation 
process produced 44,124 valid Twitter users, on 
which we then applied the following filtering 
process.  Since we decided to focus on the US 
population in the identity linkage model, we first 
filtered out all users who are not located in the US. 
To do so, we considered not only the location and 
time-zone attributes of the user profile, but also the 
geo-locations embedded in the user tweets.  Those 
users with a majority of geo-tagged tweets posted 
from outside the US were removed from 
consideration.  Finally, we removed those “inactive” 
users, i.e., those who (1) do not have any public 
tweets, or (2) do not have any followers or followees. 
After applying these filters, we were left with 
1,520 Twitter users. We then manually examined 
each of these 1,520 accounts and further excluded 
163 of them that are obviously not personal accounts 
– i.e., they are self-declared accounts for businesses 
and organizations. We used the remaining 1,357 
Twitter users to perform our subsequent analysis. 
Data Collected for Each User: For each selected 
user, we collected its OSN activities in three 
categories: 1) the user’s profile, 2) all tweets posted 
by the user, and 3) all tweets posted by the user’s 
followers that mentioned the user (i.e., tagged using 
“@” followed by the user handle).  Note that we 
considered only followers but not followees here 
because, per our experimental results, it is extremely 
unlikely for a user to be mentioned by a followee 
who is not at the same time a follower of the user.  
To collect the data, we used the Twitter Search API 
to access all information publicly available about 
users and their followers, and the Google Maps 
Geocoding API to convert the Geo-locations 
extracted from tweets to full addresses. 
5.2. Experimental Design 
The objective of experimental design is to 
identify and measure the privacy disclosure incurred 
by the collected (publicly available) data. After 
examining the collected data, we identified six 
categories of identity elements that are often 
disclosed through self- or co-disclosure on Twitter: 
name, location, gender, birthday, age, and family 
relationships (e.g., siblings, spouse, parents).  Each 
category further consists of identity elements at 
different granularities.  For example, the disclosure of 
name might be first name only, last name only, or full 
name.  Similarly, the disclosure of location 
information might be at the metropolitan area level, 
at the ZIP code level, or revealing the exact address. 
Table 2 summarizes how self- and co-disclosures 
often occur for each of these six categories of identity 
elements. It also depicts how we identify disclosures 
in our experimental study. Specifically, we followed 
a three-step, manual-automated-manual process.  We 
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started with manually examining a small sample of 
tweets to identify the disclosure patterns summarized 
in Table 2. Then, we translate each pattern to a 
filtering condition that is automatically applied to all 
downloaded tweets to identify those candidates that 
could potentially disclose private information. For 
example, candidates for birthday co-disclosure were 
identified with a conjunctive condition of (1) “@” 
another user, and (2) contains keyword “birthday”. In 
the final step, we manually examine each candidate 
to confirm self- or co-disclosures. This final step 
removes false positives that meet the candidacy 
criteria but do not actually reveal precise information, 
e.g., “your birthday is more than 6 months away”. 
One can make several observations from the 
table: First, the way identity elements are disclosed 
on Twitter is often ad-hoc, especially in the case of 
co-disclosures.  For example, user A’s birthday may 
be disclosed by a follower B’s tweet “Met @C in 
@A’s birthday party yesterday”.  There are two 
implications of such ad-hoc disclosures: First, the 
wide variety of ways for an identity element to be 
disclosed required us to manually examine the 
collected data instead of relying on an automated 
process. Second, it also calls into question the 
comprehensiveness of disclosures identified in our 
experimental design, as it is possible for a subtle 
disclosure to be missed in our manual examination 
process. We discuss the issue of comprehensiveness 
and the implications in the discussion section. 
Second, self- and co-disclosures often take 
different forms. Specifically, while self-disclosures 
usually happen through direct statements (e.g., 
describing oneself as a proud mom directly discloses 
the gender of the user), co-disclosures tend to be 
subtler, and often occur through inference – e.g., 
being tagged in a tweet that is marked with the 
location of a restaurant.  This difference makes co-
disclosures harder to identify than self-disclosures. 
Again, we discuss the implication of this difference 
in the discussion section. 
6. Research Results: RQ1 and RQ2 
Following the data collection procedure and the 
experimental design outlined in the research 
methodology section, we examined the two research 
questions RQ1 and RQ2 respectively.  Specifically, 
we first identified the self- and co-disclosures of the 
six identity elements listed in Table 2. Our study of 
RQ1 focused on comparing the two types of 
disclosures.   Then, we used the information-theoretic 
measurement of privacy disclosure to further quantify 
the average privacy loss from self- and co-
disclosures. The results were used in our study of 
RQ2, i.e., whether co-disclosures significantly 
increase privacy loss on top of self-disclosures. 
6.1. RQ1: Self-Disclosure vs Co-Disclosure 
Figure 1 depicts the percentage of the 1,357 
selected Twitter users who have their identity 
elements self- or co-disclosed through their Twitter 
activities. We marked each identity element with 
either self- or co-disclosure, leading to 12 categories. 
One can see from the figure that, for each identity 
element, the percentage of users having the element 
disclosed through either self- or co-disclosure ranges 
Table 2. Self- and Co-Disclosure of Identity Elements 
Identity Elements Self-Disclosures Co-Disclosures 
Name The name could be extracted from the 
name attribute or inferred from the screen 
name of the user profile. 
The name could be extracted from tweets 
that mention the user. 
Location 
Information 
The location could be extracted from the 
location attribute of the user profile or 
inferred from geo-enabled tweets. 
The location could be inferred from geo-
enabled tweets that tag the user. 
Gender The gender of the user could be inferred 
from the bio attribute of the user profile as 
some users describe themselves as a father 
or mother or wife or husband. 
The gender could be inferred from tweets 
mentioning the user that include relational or 
gender specific data such as sister or bro.  
Birthday Disclosed by user tweets that mention 
birthday. 
Birthday information could be inferred from 
co-owners’ tweets of birthday wishes to the 
user, e.g., “Happy Birthday” 
Age Disclosed by user tweets that mention age, 
year of birth, etc. 
Age information could also be inferred from 
birthday wishes, e.g., “Happy 43rd 
Birthday!” 
Family 
Relationships 
Relationships could be inferred from user 
tweets mentioning relatives such as 
siblings, spouses, and parents. 
Relationships could be inferred from tweets 
coming from relatives such as “Miss you 
mom” or “Happy Birthday Dad”, etc. 
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from 1.7% (co-disclosure for ZIP code) to 23.7% (co-
disclosure for gender). The comparison between self- 
and co-disclosure, however, varies significantly for 
different identity elements.  
To further study the comparison, we performed 
the paired-sample t-test for each identity element to 
determine whether there is a significant statistical 
difference between the probability of the self- and co-
disclosure of the element.  Table 3 depicts the results. 
One can see that all but one identity element exhibit 
significant difference between the levels of self- and 
co-disclosure. Specifically, for first name, age and 
ZIP code, self-disclosure is significantly more 
frequent than co-disclosure. For birthday and gender, 
co-disclosure is more frequent.  For all these five 
categories, we have p-value < 0.001. The disclosure 
of relatives (i.e., personal relationships), on the other 
hand, does not show a significant difference between 
self- and co-disclosures, with p = 0.2439.  
Another interesting observation from Table 3 is 
that self- and co-disclosure are positively correlated 
with each other.  We performed the χ2-test over each 
identity element, and the null hypothesis of 
independence is rejected for every identity element 
with p < 0.0001. 
6.2. RQ2: Does co-disclosure significantly 
increase the privacy risk? 
To address RQ2, we measured the amount of 
privacy loss resulted from the disclosure of identity 
elements. Specifically, we first measured the amount 
of privacy loss from self-disclosures, and then 
computed the amount of additional privacy loss 
caused by co-disclosures.  For example, if a user self-
discloses his/her first name but not gender, and a 
follower of the user further co-discloses the gender of 
the user, then the amount of additional privacy 
disclosure is not 1 bit (as disclosing gender would 
incur), but only 0.2 bit because, per Table 1, the 
privacy loss from self-disclosure, i.e., first name, is 
10.7 bits while the total loss from both self- and co-
disclosures is 10.9 bits.  As such, the amount of 
additional privacy loss caused by co-disclosure is 
10.9 – 10.7 = 0.2 bit. 
Figure 2 depicts the results from our study on 
users with both self- and co-disclosures.  Note from 
the figure that we grouped all these users into 10 
buckets according to the amount of privacy loss from 
self-disclosure alone.  The first bucket, for example, 
consists of the users with self-disclosure privacy loss 
at 0 – 10 percentile (i.e., the lowest 10% of all 
users).  Then, for each bucket, we measured the 
average amount of additional privacy loss caused by 
co-disclosures. 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of Self- and Co-Disclosure for Identity Elements 
Table 3. Statistical Differences between Self- and Co-Disclosures (Paired-Sample t-test) 
Category Identity 
Element 
Self-Disclosed Co-Disclosed Disclosed by both p-value 
Self > Co first name 181 71 66 1.4495e-24 
age 96 58 21 3.2160e-04 
zip 251 24 12 2.7818e-50 
Co > Self birthday 135 233 79 9.3014e-12 
gender 27 322 15 3.9476e-68 
Insignificant  relatives 71 83 24 0.2439 
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Somewhat surprisingly, the figure appears to 
suggest that, the less a user self-discloses, the more 
his/her followers are likely to co-disclose about 
him/her.  While this result might appear counter-
intuitive - what it indeed entails is that, for the same 
co-disclosure behavior, the less information a user 
self-discloses, the more damage (to privacy) the co-
disclosure will incur.  Although not shown in Figure 
2, we studied the correlation between the amount of 
self-disclosure and co-disclosures alone, and the 
Pearson correlation coefficient between them is 
0.0598 – demonstrating a positive, albeit weak, 
correlation. On the other hand, if we measure the 
correlation between the privacy loss from self-
disclosure and the additional privacy loss from co-
disclosure, the coefficient becomes -0.6689, 
confirming our observation of the negative 
correlation from Figure 2. 
7. Discussions  
Comprehensiveness of Self- and Co-Disclosure 
Identification: As mentioned in the experimental 
design section, we identified in our studies numerous 
possible ways for identity elements to be disclosed 
through inferences - e.g., the timestamp of a “happy 
birthday” message discloses the birthday of the 
recipient, while the tagging of a user in a “bachelor’s 
party” or “girls’ night out” reveals the gender.  
Given the ad hoc nature of such inference channel, it 
is important for us to admit that the disclosures 
identified in our study might not be comprehensive.  
For example, if a user is tagged in a message 
describing a movie watching party for “The 
Sisterhood of The Traveling Pants”, then the gender 
and age of the user may be inferred with a high 
confidence, given that the movie is also perceived as 
targeting a female, younger, audience.  It is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to identify all such 
disclosure channels and measure them in a systematic 
manner.  For example, we could not find accurate 
statistics for the viewer distribution of the movie.  
Thus, in this paper, we focused on only those 
disclosures that deterministically reveal an identity 
element of the user, and did not further study the vast 
varieties of other, probabilistic, inference channels. 
Despite the lack of comprehensiveness on the 
identification of self- and co-disclosure channels, we 
would like to emphasize our belief that the results 
presented in this paper remain valid even after 
considering other disclosure channels.  The main 
reason is the observation discussed in the 
experimental design section: while self-disclosure 
often takes the form of direct statements, it is co-
disclosure that usually occurs over the subtle, 
complex and hard-to-enumerate inference channels. 
Thus, the importance of co-disclosures could only be 
amplified if we were to include the probabilistic 
inference channels into consideration.  Given that the 
results in this paper already demonstrate the 
additional privacy loss incurred by co-disclosures, we 
leave the investigations of probabilistic inference 
channels to future studies. 
Effects of Privacy Settings: Currently, Twitter 
allows users to adjust their privacy settings to hide 
their twitters and the list of their followers / followees 
(but not their profile information, like self-
descriptions).  Interestingly, we found that making 
one’s Twitter account private is not an effective way 
to thwart the co-disclosures discussed in this paper. 
Specifically, the information that constitutes co-
disclosures remains publicly accessible, just more 
difficult to find for an adversary.  For example, even 
if User A sets her Twitter account to be private, one 
can still find A’s name in the follower list of user B, 
if B sets her account to be public. Similarly, the 
tagging of user A remains publicly visible in the 
tweets posed by User B.  These policies make it 
impossible for a user to block co-disclosures through 
adjusting his/her privacy settings at Twitter.  
Nevertheless, setting one’s account to private does 
make it harder for an adversary to discover the co-
disclosures, as it would have to (somehow) find the 
followers of the user without access to a 
comprehensive list.  This is still feasible, however, 
especially when the adversary has the technical 
capacity to store and index all tweets (e.g., from the 
Twitter Firehose) that might contain information 
about the user of interest. 
Limitations: We acknowledge several limitations in 
our studies.  First, the scale of the experiments was 
constrained by the query access limitation enforced 
by Twitter, i.e., its APIs limit the number of requests 
to 15 or 180 requests per 15-minute window. This, in 
turn, limited the number of users that could be 
 
Figure 2. Additional Privacy Loss from Co-Disclosure 
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included in the experiments, given that we would 
have to query every follower of each selected user.  
Second, Twitter limits the maximum number of 
tweets from one user that can be retrieved through the 
Search API to 3,200.  In our experiments, 168 out of 
1,357 users triggered this limit - i.e., for these users, 
only the most recent 3,200 tweets were retrieved 
through the API and considered in our experiments. 
While these 168 users tend to be the most active ones 
who already have high levels of privacy disclosure 
(their average self-disclosure based privacy loss is 
26.46 bits, compared an average of 5.00 bits for all 
1,357 users), the limitation of 3,200 tweets makes it 
possible for our study to still underestimate the 
privacy loss for these users.  To this end, we plan to 
conduct a future study on privacy loss from a 
longitudinal perspective, to understand the impact of 
such limit on the disclosure of privacy information. 
Another limitation of our approach stems from 
the manual efforts in our experimental design.  While 
such efforts are essential to eliminating false 
positives and establishing lower-bound estimates of 
disclosures, they prevent the study from scaling to a 
larger sample of Twitter users. To this end, we plan 
to investigate in future studies the usage of text 
mining and natural language processing (NLP) 
techniques to automate disclosure identifications. 
8. Conclusions 
In this paper, we presented an empirical, data-
driven study quantifying the extent to which others’ 
co-disclosure of information about an individual 
could lead to actual privacy harm.  We developed an 
innovative measurement to capture an individual’s 
actual privacy loss caused by co- vs. self-disclosure, 
and collected data from Twitter to show significant 
harms caused by co-disclosure and illustrate the 
interesting differences between different identity 
elements revealed through self- and co-disclosure.  
The current study contributes to privacy practices in 
two important ways: First, an understanding of what 
information tend to get co-disclosed helps OSN users 
with properly regulating self-disclosures, to prevent 
the inference of sensitive data from a combination of 
self- and co-disclosures.  Second, an understanding of 
how co-disclosure contributes to the identification of 
an individual also changes how businesses harvest 
customer information, and in turn prompts OSNs to 
revisit their privacy policies and access control 
practices. It is our hope that this work will inspire and 
motivate more data-driven studies to measure real 
privacy harms with observational data in the future.  
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